The rigidity bias
Herrala, Risto (14.11.2003)
Numero
31/2003Julkaisija
Suomen Pankki
2003
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-20140807568Tiivistelmä
We study the basic economic problem of choice between long-term and short-term commitments under a general characterization of uncertainty (aggregate uncertainty).When contingencies are contractible, a perfect market of Arrow-Debreau contingent claims implements the social optimum.When contingencies are not contractible, long-term commitments receive too much weight in individual portfolios.The economy as a whole is too rigid during periods of high aggregate shocks.The model links a rigidity bias with the operation of the price mechanism and the monetary system. Keywords: liquidity, central banking, monetary system JEL classification numbers: G0, E0