Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
Miettinen, Paavo (01.03.2010)
Numero
7/2010Julkaisija
Bank of Finland
2010
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-20140807382Tiivistelmä
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction.
Julkaisuhuomautus
Published in Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 148, Issue 3, May 2013, Pages 1213-1225 ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.018