Russian society, democratic values, and the legacy of the early-1990s economic shock
Alexeev, Michael; Pyle, William; Wang, Jiaan (26.11.2025)
Numero
9/2025Julkaisija
Bank of Finland
2025
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe20251126112022Tiivistelmä
Although it has been speculated that the pain and dislocation of the early 1990s left Russians with an abiding distaste for the values that animated the transition from communism, the quantitative evidence for a lasting effect is thin. Drawing on a large, regionally representative survey from 2010, we show that in regions where the embrace of liberal values declined most in the early 1990s, support for democratic values remained weakest a generation later. Instrumenting for the change in values in the early 1990s with variables that capture Soviet-era economic distortions, we connect the vulnerability of a region to the market liberalization shock of 1992 to its diminished support for liberal political values in both shorter and longer runs, particularly for the older cohorts who would have experienced the early 1990s as adults. The endurance of the effect of the early 1990s economic shock stands in contrast to research from other contexts that the attitudinal effects of economic shocks experienced after early adulthood are short-lived. We speculate that a possible explanation for why the effect of the early 1990s endures in Russia was the amplification of the economic shock by an “identity shock” related to Russia’s post-imperial loss of status. In support of this hypothesis, we use multiple waves of the Integrated Values Survey (IVS) to show that in Russia, the demand for democratic values declined in the first half of the 1990s relative to other former communist countries, opening a values gap that persisted through at least 2017. Lastly, we draw on a recent survey experiment to show that respondents primed to consider the economic collapse of the early 1990s, and to a lesser extent the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are less likely to embrace democratic values than those in a control group.
Julkaisuhuomautus
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
FOCUS
This paper explores whether the economic shock of the early 1990s endures in the worldview of Russians a generation later. It shows that in regions most vulnerable to the rapid market liberalization of 1992, survey respondents in the 2010s were more likely to turn against the liberal political values that had animated the transition.
CONTRIBUTION
This paper offers empirical support for a claim often made by observers: that Russia’s wrenching exit from communism helped set it on the illiberal trajectory it has followed into the twenty-first century. In contrast to much of the literature on the attitudinal consequences of economic shocks, it demonstrates that, under certain circumstances, such effects can persist.
FINDINGS
In 2010 and 2017, individuals living in regions more vulnerable to the market-liberalization shock of 1992 were less likely to embrace liberal political values and less likely to participate in civic organizations. These effects are strongest among those who would have been working-age adults in 1992. Weaker, but still discernible, effects among younger cohorts suggest a degree of intergenerational transmission of values.
FOCUS
This paper explores whether the economic shock of the early 1990s endures in the worldview of Russians a generation later. It shows that in regions most vulnerable to the rapid market liberalization of 1992, survey respondents in the 2010s were more likely to turn against the liberal political values that had animated the transition.
CONTRIBUTION
This paper offers empirical support for a claim often made by observers: that Russia’s wrenching exit from communism helped set it on the illiberal trajectory it has followed into the twenty-first century. In contrast to much of the literature on the attitudinal consequences of economic shocks, it demonstrates that, under certain circumstances, such effects can persist.
FINDINGS
In 2010 and 2017, individuals living in regions more vulnerable to the market-liberalization shock of 1992 were less likely to embrace liberal political values and less likely to participate in civic organizations. These effects are strongest among those who would have been working-age adults in 1992. Weaker, but still discernible, effects among younger cohorts suggest a degree of intergenerational transmission of values.