Are firm- and country-specific governance substitutes? : Evidence from financial contracts in emerging markets
Francis, Bill; Hasan, Iftekhar; Song, Liang (09.04.2012)
Numero
12/2012Julkaisija
Bank of Finland
2012
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-20140807127Tiivistelmä
We investigate how borrowers corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm-level and country-level corporate governance are substitutes in writing and enforcing financial contracts. We also find that the distinctiveness of borrowers characteristics affect the relation between firm-level corporate governance and loan contracting terms. Our findings are robust, irrespective of types of regression methods and specifications. JEL Classification: G20, G30, G31, G34, G38.
Julkaisuhuomautus
Published in Journal of Financial Research, Volume 35, Issue 3, October 2012: 343-374