Adverse selection and financing of innovation : is there a need for R&D subsidies?
Takalo, Tuomas; Tanayama, Tanja (01.07.2008)
JulkaisusarjaBank of Finland Research Discussion Papers
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite onhttps://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-20140807112
We study the interaction between private and public funding of innovative projects in the presence of adverse-selection based financing constraints. Government programmes allocating direct subsidies are based on ex-ante screening of the subsidy applications. This selection scheme may yield valuable information to market-based financiers. We find that under certain conditions, public R&D subsidies can reduce the financing constraints of technology-based entrepreneurial firms. Firstly, the subsidy itself reduces the capital costs related to innovation projects by reducing the amount of market-based capital required. Secondly, the observation that an entrepreneur has received a subsidy for an innovation project provides an informative signal to market-based financiers. We also find that public screening works more efficiently if it is accompanied by subsidy allocation. Keywords: adverse selection, innovation finance, financial constraints, R&D subsidies, certification JEL classification numbers: D82, G28, H20, O30, O38
Published in Journal of Technology Transfer, Volume 35, Number 1, February 2010: 16-41