Haku

We augment the LLSV creditor rights index with a new “restructuring index” that measures the incentives provided to creditors to grant concessions outside formal bankruptcy. We study the joint impact of the two indexes on ...

We conduct a welfare analysis of R&D subsidies and tax credits using a model of innovation policy in corporating externalities, limited R&D participation and financial market imperfections. We estimate the model using R&D ...

We investigate the role played by systematic monetary policy in tackling the real effects of uncertainty shocks in U.S. recessions and expansions. We model key indicators of the business cycle with a nonlinear VAR that ...

We develop a business cycle model with gross flows of firm creation and destruction.The credit market is characterized by two frictions. First,entrepreneurs undergo a costly search for intermediate funding to create a firm. ...

We examine how firms respond to uncertainty around U.S. tax policy changes, namely the individual level tax rate increases set to take effect on January 1, 2011 and January 1, 2013. We provide evidence that firms time the ...

We consider optimal capital requirements for banks' lending activities when the potential trade-off between financial stability and economic (productivity) growth is taken into account. Both sides of the trade-off are ...

We estimate the ECB’s monetary policy reaction function by using real time Eurosystem/ECB staff macroeconomic projection data, which are presented to the ECB’s Governing Council when it assesses the monetary policy stance ...

We generalize the Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011) sum-of-the-parts method for forecasting stock market returns. Rather than summing the parts of stock returns, we suggest summing some of the frequency-decomposed parts. The ...

This study estimates the effect of the European Central Bank’s second series of targeted longerterm refinancing operations (TLTRO-II) on bank lending using bank level data from multiple countries and instrumental variable ...

Regulators restrict bankers’ risk-taking by bonus caps or deferrals. We derive a structural model to analyze these compensation regulations and show that for a risk-neutral banker subject to positive switching costs of ...