Haku

​Concern that government may not guarantee bank deposits in a future crisis can cause a bank run. The government may break its guarantee during a severe crisis because of time-inconsistent preferences regarding the use of ...

I calibrate switching cost for the Finnish retail deposit market by using the approach developed by Oz Shy (2002). It turns out that switching costs faced by deposit customers of the main banks are high, ranging from 200 ...

Failure in bank corporate governance has been seen as a contributing factor to excessive risk-taking pre-crisis with devastating implications as risks realised during the financial crisis. Unfortunately, the empirical ...

Using a sample of 161 global banks in 23 countries, we examine the applicability of structural models and bank fundamentals to price global bank credit risk. First, we find that variables predicted by structural models ...

Using the Eurosystem’s proprietary interbank loan data from more than one thousand banks, practically all major banks in Europe for 2008-2016, we show that larger European banks have had a lower cost of overnight borrowing ...

The NSFR regulation reduces banks’ liquidity risks by encouraging the use of deposit funding. Deposit money is created by lending, but the requirement restricts possibilities to grant loans. This contradiction may be ...

We develop a business cycle model with gross flows of firm creation and destruction.The credit market is characterized by two frictions. First,entrepreneurs undergo a costly search for intermediate funding to create a firm. ...

This study estimates the effect of the European Central Bank’s second series of targeted longerterm refinancing operations (TLTRO-II) on bank lending using bank level data from multiple countries and instrumental variable ...

Regulators restrict bankers’ risk-taking by bonus caps or deferrals. We derive a structural model to analyze these compensation regulations and show that for a risk-neutral banker subject to positive switching costs of ...