Studies on market structure and technological innovation
Saarenheimo, Tuomas (01.09.1994)
Numero
49Julkaisija
Suomen Pankki
1994
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-201708161559Sisällysluettelo
1.1 On The Nature of Innovation
1.1.1 A Taxonomy for R&D
1.1.2 Uncertainty and Divisibility
1.1.3 Economic Properties of Technology
1.2 Economic Analysis of Innovation
1.2.1 History
1.2.2 Schumpeter's Hypothesis
1.2.3 Theoretical Approaches
1.3 Three Aspects of Market Structure and Innovation
1.3.1 Market Structure and the Choice of Research Strategy
1.3.2 The Propensity to Patent
1.3.3 Research Joint Ventures and Cartels or Competitive R&D?
2 The Choice of Research Strategy in a Patent Race
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Definition of Risk
2.3 The Model .
2.4 The Analysis
2.4.1 Symmetric Equilibrium .
2.4.2 Asymmetric Equilibria .
2.5 A Modification: Stochastic Payoffs
2.6 Conclusions
3 Market Structure and the Propensity to Patent: Patenting or Secrecy?
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Basic Setup
3.3 Concentration and Patenting: Complete Information
3.3.1 Patenting Equilibrium
3.3.2 Equilibrium without Patenting
3.3.3 A Generalization: Shared Surplus
3.4 Concentration and Patenting: Incomplete Information
3.5 Firm Size and Patenting: Complete Information
3.6 Firm Size and Patenting: Incomplete Information
3.7 Conclusions
4 Research Joint Ventures vs.R&D Competition
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Model
4.3 The Analysis
4.4 Comparison of the scenarios
4.5 Conclusions
1.1.1 A Taxonomy for R&D
1.1.2 Uncertainty and Divisibility
1.1.3 Economic Properties of Technology
1.2 Economic Analysis of Innovation
1.2.1 History
1.2.2 Schumpeter's Hypothesis
1.2.3 Theoretical Approaches
1.3 Three Aspects of Market Structure and Innovation
1.3.1 Market Structure and the Choice of Research Strategy
1.3.2 The Propensity to Patent
1.3.3 Research Joint Ventures and Cartels or Competitive R&D?
2 The Choice of Research Strategy in a Patent Race
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Definition of Risk
2.3 The Model .
2.4 The Analysis
2.4.1 Symmetric Equilibrium .
2.4.2 Asymmetric Equilibria .
2.5 A Modification: Stochastic Payoffs
2.6 Conclusions
3 Market Structure and the Propensity to Patent: Patenting or Secrecy?
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Basic Setup
3.3 Concentration and Patenting: Complete Information
3.3.1 Patenting Equilibrium
3.3.2 Equilibrium without Patenting
3.3.3 A Generalization: Shared Surplus
3.4 Concentration and Patenting: Incomplete Information
3.5 Firm Size and Patenting: Complete Information
3.6 Firm Size and Patenting: Incomplete Information
3.7 Conclusions
4 Research Joint Ventures vs.R&D Competition
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Model
4.3 The Analysis
4.4 Comparison of the scenarios
4.5 Conclusions