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Table 1 Summary statistics on firms

	Non-members of regional association	Members of multi-sector association	Members of sector-specific association
Basic characteristics			
Full-time employees	390.6 (110)	867.4 (280)	801.1 (330)
First registered after 1991 (%)	44.1	43.4	29.2
State or municipal enterprise (%)	6.3	2.9	4.2
Influence of foreign shareholders (0-4 scale)	0.16 (0)	0.28 (0)	0.06 (0)
Level of technology (1-4 scale)	1.88 (2)	2.04 (2)	2.00 (2)
Located in Moscow (%)	4.1	2.9	4.2
Located in St Petersburg (%)	2.5	2.9	8.3
Located in capital city of territorial subject (%)	66.2	74.1	72.9
Competition			
Competition in output market (1-5 scale)	4.08 (4)	4.11 (5)	4.50 (5)
Major competitors include firms in other Russian regions (%)	55.3	70.7	62.5
Major competitors include firms in other countries (%)	22.9	40.0	35.4
Trade partners			
Sell to firms in other Russian regions (%)	53.7	74.6	62.5
Sell to firms in other countries (%)	24.0	45.4	33.3
Sell to Russian government (fulfill government orders) (%)	22.6	24.4	29.2
Sell to firms in same commercial group (%)	12.5	13.2	12.5
Purchase inputs from firms in other Russian regions (%)	59.7	72.7	62.5
Purchase inputs from firms in other countries (%)	26.2	40.0	43.8
Purchase inputs from Russian government (%)	7.1	6.8	14.6
Purchase inputs from firms in same commercial group (%)	11.2	12.2	10.4
Sectors			
Metallurgy	12.5	12.7	6.3
Machine building and metal working	14.7	23.4	10.4
Chemicals	15.0	11.7	6.3
Wood processing and paper	14.7	9.7	12.5
Building materials	15.3	10.7	20.8
Textiles	12.3	18.1	25.0
Food processing	15.5	13.6	18.8
Number of observations	367	205	48

Note: Median responses in parentheses.

Table 2 Summary statistics on regional associations

	Multi-sector	Sector-specific
Basic characteristics		
Number of sectors represented (1-14)	8.52 (9)	1 (1)
Full-time employees	19.30 (6)	2.47 (2)
Years since founding	9.01 (9)	6.67 (6)
Members exclusively in single city (%)	41.9	9.5
Located in Moscow (%)	4.0	0.0
Located in St. Petersburg (%)	4.0	9.5
Located in capital city of territorial subject (%)	59.7	85.7
Founder(s)		
Other business association(s) (%)	44.4	33.3
Individual(s), entrepreneur(s) (%)	50.0	57.1
Government body at federal, regional and/or municipal level (%)	22.6	23.8
Unions (%)	1.6	4.8
Individuals formerly in government (%)	6.5	4.8
Individuals formerly in Communist Party (%)	8.9	0.0
Sectors		
Metallurgy (%)	40.3	4.8
Chemicals (%)	50.0	9.5
Machine building and metal working (%)	70.2	4.8
Building materials (%)	68.5	0.0
Wood processing and paper	58.9	23.8
Light industry (%)	73.4	23.8
Food processing (%)	83.9	23.8
Transportation (%)	70.2	--
Communications (%)	47.6	--
Trade (%)	79.8	--
Finance, credit and insurance (%)	66.1	--
Healthcare (%)	44.4	--
Education and science (%)	56.5	--
Other (%)	42.5	09.5
Number of observations	123	21

Notes: Median responses in parentheses.

Table 3 How important are the following services to your association at the present time?

Lobbying government officials	4.50
Participating in development of legislation	4.31
Participation in development of industrial policy	4.23
Helping develop small businesses	4.17
Providing informational, legal, consulting services	4.07
Protecting firms from illegitimate government interference	3.99
Helping firms develop contacts with other Russian firms	3.94
Helping develop a "social partnership" in social-labor sphere	3.63
Helping develop behavioral standards/ethics	3.59
Assisting in resolution of disputes between firms	3.59
Helping firms develop contacts with foreign firms	3.09
Number of observations	145

Notes: 1=not important at all; 5=extremely important.

Table 4 Does your firm try to influence the contents of new laws and regulations?
If so, whose assistance does it seek? (%)

	All firms	Regional lobby members	All firms that try to influence	All regional lobby members that try to influence
Assistance sought from:				
business associations	10.9	20.9	30.3	39.7
personnel from executive branch	20.1	32.2	56.0	61.1
personnel from legislative branch	14.5	24.3	40.4	46.0
mass media	8.1	12.1	22.5	23.0
trade unions	4.8	7.9	13.3	15.1
influential individuals/entrepreneurs	7.1	10.9	19.7	20.5
Does not try to influence	64.0	47.3	--	--

Table 5 Who appeals to business associations when trying to influence design of new laws and regulations?

Model	All firms			Members of regional association		
	(1) Probit	(2) Probit	(3) Probit	(4) Probit	(5) Probit	(6) Probit
Member of multi-sector association			0.127*** (0.034)			
Member of sector-specific association			0.121* (0.067)			0.050 (0.083)
Full-time employees (log)	0.010 (0.009)	0.062*** (0.020)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.029)	0.140** (0.070)	-0.008 (0.028)
Founded in post-Soviet era	0.078*** (0.017)	0.078*** (0.017)	0.079*** (0.016)	0.152*** (0.048)	0.153*** (0.047)	0.151*** (0.048)
State or municipal enterprise	-0.014 (0.041)	-0.007 (0.040)	-0.003 (0.041)	-0.090 (0.082)	-0.077 (0.072)	-0.091 (0.078)
Influence of foreign shareholders	0.008 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.010 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.030)
Relative quality of capital equipment	0.005 (0.012)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000 (0.010)	-0.023 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.032)	-0.022 (0.034)
Degree of competition in output market	0.029*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.072** (0.035)	0.075** (0.035)	0.068** (0.034)
Political competition in region	0.035*** (0.013)	0.123*** (0.041)	0.024* (0.013)	0.060* (0.036)	0.324** (0.154)	0.056 (0.036)
Political competition x full-time employees		- 0.016*** (0.006)			-0.043** (0.021)	
GRP share of largest sector in region	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region	-0.059* (0.031)	-0.061** (0.030)	-0.047 (0.031)	-0.079 (0.095)	-0.096 (0.096)	-0.068 (0.095)
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP in region	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Per capita income (log) in region	-0.063 (0.048)	-0.049 (0.044)	-0.072* (0.040)	-0.053 (0.103)	-0.022 (0.099)	-0.056 (0.101)
Competitor and trade partner controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	583	583	583	235	235	235
Adjusted R2	0.1721	0.1801	0.2462	0.1881	0.2046	0.1901

Marginal effects from probit model are reported; robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively.






Table 6 Intensity of enterprise managers' interests with respect to government intervention: promoting industrial policy and instituting regional trade barriers

Model	All firms		Members of regional associations	
	Industrial policy	Import barriers	Industrial policy	Import barriers
	(1) Ordered probit	(2) Ordered probit	(3) Ordered probit	(4) Ordered probit
Member of multi-sector association	0.136 (0.126)	0.125 (0.096)		
Member of sector-specific association	0.355** (0.17)	0.400** (0.188)	0.284 (0.218)	0.501** (0.204)
Full-time employees (log)	-0.095** (0.047)	-0.028 (0.044)	-0.192** (0.089)	-0.117* (0.06)
Founded in post-Soviet era	-0.224** (0.098)	-0.042 (0.104)	-0.484*** (0.173)	-0.322* (0.191)
State or municipal enterprise	0.521** (0.227)	0.045 (0.209)	0.706 (0.549)	-0.362 (0.328)
Influence of foreign shareholders	-0.123 (0.084)	0.018 (0.098)	-0.296** (0.119)	0.022 (0.137)
Relative quality of capital equipment	0.061 (0.114)	-0.120** (0.06)	0.254 (0.163)	0.046 (0.1)
Degree of competition in output market	0.023 (0.052)	0.026 (0.047)	-0.014 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.086)
Political competition in region	-0.047 (0.058)	-0.082 (0.062)	-0.131 (0.126)	-0.045 (0.089)
GRP share of largest sector in region	0.001 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.005 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.021)
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region	-0.024 (0.17)	0.204 (0.154)	-0.054 (0.269)	-0.202 (0.302)
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP in region	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.007)
Per capita income (log) in region	0.13 (0.202)	0.221 (0.278)	0.123 (0.423)	0.204 (0.532)
Competitor and trade partner controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	579	579	234	234
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Adjusted R2	0.0336	0.0263	0.0902	0.0615

Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively.

Table 7 Intensity of association managers' interests with respect to government intervention:
promoting industrial policy, instituting regional trade barriers, promoting WTO accession

	Industrial policy	Import bar- riers	WTO and re- gion	WTO and country
Model	(1) Ordered probit	(2) Ordered probit	(3) Ordered probit	(4) Ordered probit
Number of sectors represented in mem- bership	-0.001 (0.034)	-0.070** (0.032)	0.083** (0.036)	0.049** (0.021)
Founders include other business associa- tion(s)	-0.794** (0.346)	-0.534** (0.241)	0.327 (0.273)	0.291 (0.230)
Full-time employees (log)	0.036 (0.099)	-0.006 (0.098)	0.196* (0.104)	0.101 (0.066)
Years since founding (log)	-0.061 (0.224)	0.135 (0.236)	-0.339 (0.215)	-0.072 (0.186)
Membership from one city	0.201 (0.397)	0.222 (0.272)	0.420 (0.316)	0.045 (0.234)
Political competition in region	0.112 (0.150)	0.103 (0.127)	-0.057 (0.109)	0.056 (0.121)
GRP share of largest sector in region	0.009 (0.018)	-0.053*** (0.013)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region	-0.828 (1.011)	-0.237 (0.473)	1.580** (0.709)	1.245 (0.987)
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP in region	0.000 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.002 (0.010)
Per capita income (log) in region	0.527 (0.690)	1.041** (0.486)	-0.397 (0.663)	-0.479 (0.565)
Location controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Founder controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number	135	135	113	134
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Adjusted R2	0.0874	0.0791	0.0935	0.0534

Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively.

Table 8 Relative importance of business representation services to members of regional business associations

	Lobbying	Participating in legislative process	Participating in design of industrial policy	Transmitting business interests to state officials
Model	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS
Member of sector-specific association	0.031** (0.013)	0.005 (0.009)	0.003 (0.016)	0.038* (0.021)
Full-time employees (log)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.022*** (0.005)
Founded in post-Soviet era	0.004 (0.009)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.008 (0.011)	0.030** (0.014)
State or municipal enterprise	-0.037* (0.022)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.046 (0.039)	-0.096 (0.068)
Influence of foreign shareholders	0.003 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.008)
Relative quality of capital equipment	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.025* (0.014)
Degree of competition in output market	-0.004* (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)
Political competition in region	0.004 (0.005)	0.000 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)	0.007 (0.009)
GRP share of largest sector in region	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region	-0.005 (0.011)	0.000 (0.019)	0.002 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.042)
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP in region	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)
Per capita income (log) in region	0.034** (0.016)	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.018)	0.112*** (0.029)
Competitor and trade partner controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	208	208	208	208
R2	0.2176	0.2184	0.1597	0.2439

Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively.

ⁱ Russia's WTO was one element of a series of structural reforms that President Putin was pushing for during his first term. Indeed, at the time of the surveys, most optimistic commentators expected membership to come as early as the end of 2004.

ⁱⁱ Positive welfare effects are also found from micro-simulations based on extensive household-level data (Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). For additional World Bank research on the topic, see <http://go.worldbank.org/CJQ7ZLJJF0>.

ⁱⁱⁱ Since two of the three questions deal explicitly with barriers to trade, we should note that Olson highlighted that free trade was the most effective means for mitigating the malign effects of business lobby groups. We might thus presume that in questions of trade protection and market access, we would observe most clearly differences in the policy interests of more and less encompassing associations. Olson writes, "Because free trade and factor movement evade and undercut distributional coalitions ... free trade undermines cartelization of firms, and indirectly also reduces monopoly power in the labor market. (142)"

^{iv} Our approach here mirrors that taken in the literature exploring the relationship between individual characteristics and preferences regarding government intervention in the flows of labor and goods across national borders (Mayda, 2006; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006).

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