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RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS IN A MACROMODEL:
SOME COMPARATIVE ANALYSES WITH FINNISH DATA***

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ABSTRACT

This paper reports some policy experiments carried out with the QMED model of the Bank of Finland. The main issue in these experiments is the role of expectations. Thus, we compare a static expectations version with two rational expectations versions of the model. These two versions differ in terms of the time horizon of expectations. When various policy simulations are carried out with these different versions - both in terms of anticipated and unanticipated shocks - it turns out that the whole short-run dynamics is crucially affected by the way in which expectations are modelled. In particular, we find the advance effects in the case of the rational expectations versions can be of considerable magnitude.

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1 INTRODUCTION

This paper reports some policy experiments carried out with the Quarterly Model of the Economics Department of the Bank of Finland (QMED). In designing these experiments we have paid particular attention to the role of expectations. Thus, in essence we have two model specifications to be compared: a model version in which expectations - to be more precise, inflation and income expectations - are modelled using a simple static scheme and a model version in which these expectations are modelled using the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. Obviously, the rational expectations version is of special interest because it allows us to examine the difference between anticipated and unanticipated policy changes and the importance of the time horizon of expectations. In addition, it is of some interest to investigate how various computational aspects affect the simulation results.

The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present a short summary of the current version of our model and discuss some problems connected with estimating and simulating the model. Section 3 contains the simulation results, and, finally, there is a brief concluding section.

2 A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE QMED MODEL

QMED is a small, aggregative quarterly model of the Finnish economy. The current version consists of 79 endogenous and exogenous variables, the number of stochastic equations being 21. However, 6 of these equations are some sort of auxiliary equations for income accounting, the structure of private consumption expenditure, and employment and the labor force. The remaining 15 main equations are reported in Table 1. In order to save space only the coefficient estimates and the basic equation statistics are reported. (The

Table 1

OLS Estimates of the Main Behavioral Equations of the QMED-Model

$$(1) \quad \Delta x = - .346*\Delta x(-4) - .669*\Delta pxf(-2) - .369*(x-f)(-1) \\ + .363*(x-f)(-2) + .800*\Delta f + .638*\Delta f(-2) + .360*cap(-2)$$

$$R^2 = .553 \quad D-W = 2.181 \quad SE = .052$$

$$(2) \quad \Delta m = 1.184*\Delta z + .704*\Delta pzm - .484*(m-z)(-1) \\ + .263*(m-z)(-2) + .204*(m-z)(-3) - .250*cap(-1)$$

$$R^2 = .569 \quad D-W = 2.342 \quad SE = .055$$

$$(3) \quad c = .595*c(-1) + .410*yhr(+1) - .002*(r-(400*\Delta pc(+1))) \\ - .685*\Delta pc(+1) + .023*d1 + 1.800$$

$$R^2 = .992 \quad D-W = 2.474 \quad SE = .012$$

$$(4) \quad ih = .614*ih(-1) + .128*yhr(+1) - 1.915*hk(-1) + 13.630*n \\ - .001*(r-(400*\Delta pc(+1))) - 0.447*pcih(-4) - 84.879$$

$$R^2 = .728 \quad D-W = 2.285 \quad SE = .046$$

$$(5) \quad \Delta if = \Delta ye - .399*(if-y)(-1) - .062*d13*(if-y)(-1) \\ - .001*\Delta(r-(400*\Delta pi))(-1) - .494*\Delta wr(-4) + .111*d14 \\ + .110*d15 + .111*d16 - .896$$

$$R^2 = .572 \quad D-W = 2.351 \quad SE = .045$$

$$(6) \quad \Delta l = .197*\Delta l(-4) + 1.311*\Delta yi - .049*\Delta wr(-4) \\ - .201*(1-n)(-1) - .042*cap(-1) \\ - .004*d2 + .024*d3 + .007*d4 - .296$$

$$R^2 = .653 \quad D-W = 1.493 \quad SE = .004$$

$$(7) \quad \Delta w = .109*\Delta 4(pc(+1)) + .894*\Delta wc - .011*cap(-1)$$

$$R^2 = .886 \quad D-W = 1.915 \quad SE = .005$$

$$(8) \quad \Delta pc = .305*\Delta wn + .127*\Delta w(-1) + .232*\Delta wn(-2) + .078*\Delta pm \\ + .058*\Delta pm(-1) + .053*pm(-2)$$

$$R^2 = .695 \quad D-W = 1.975 \quad SE = .007$$

$$(9) \quad \Delta pi = .591*\Delta wn + .043*\Delta pm0 + .043*\Delta pm(-2) + .182*\Delta pi(-1) \\ + .012*d5 + .013*d6$$

$$R^2 = .437 \quad D-W = 2.173 \quad SE = .015$$

$$(10) \quad \Delta pg = .595*\Delta wn + .218*\Delta wn(-3) + .099*\Delta pm + .008*d7 \\ - .053*d8 + .028*d9$$

$$R^2 = .725 \quad D-W = 1.963 \quad SE = .010$$

$$(11) \Delta p_x = .156 * \Delta^2(\Delta p_x(-2)) + .300 * \Delta w_n + .503 * \Delta p_f + .192 * \Delta e_r(-4) \\ + .060 * d_{10} + .057 * d_{11}$$

$$R^2 = .705 \quad D-W = 2.047 \quad SE = .019$$

$$(12) r = .732 * r(-1) + 9.444 \Delta p_c + .240 * r_d + 3.332 * \Delta d_r$$

$$R^2 = .892 \quad D-W = 1.750 \quad SE = .546$$

$$(13) q = .440 * q(-1) + .552 * z + .084 * i_g - .108 * d_{12} - 1.547$$

$$R^2 = .988 \quad D-W = 1.369 \quad SE = .020$$

$$(14) cap = .006 * t - 2.066 + .7 * k(-1) + .3 * n - q + m_r$$

$$(15) \Delta w_c = g_p(-3) + .370 * \Delta p_c(-3) + .315 * \Delta(w-w_c)(-3) \\ + .046 * d_{17} + .001$$

$$R^2 = .228 \quad D-W = 2.272 \quad SE = .013$$

All variables, except r , are expressed in logs, and all expenditures are defined in real terms. The number of lags in quarters is shown in parentheses after each lagged variable (i.e. (-1) refers to period $t-1$ and (+1) to period $t+1$). Δ denotes the first backwards differencing operator and Δ^4 denotes the fourth backwards differencing operator. R^2 = coefficient of determination, $D-W$ = Durbin - Watson statistic and SE = standard error of estimate.

List of variables
(Exogenous variables are underlined.)

c	private consumption
cap	capacity utilization rate in manufacturing
<u>d1-d17</u>	dummy variables
<u>er</u>	exchange rate
<u>f</u>	foreign import demand
<u>g</u>	public consumption
gp	rate of change in labour productivity (five-year moving average)
hk	stock of residential capital
ig	public consumption and investment
<u>if</u>	manufacturing investment
ih	housing investment
k	stock of capital, manufacturing sector
l	wage-earners' employment
m	imports (excluding oil)
<u>mr</u>	scale parameter for capacity utilization
<u>n</u>	working-age population
<u>pc</u>	private consumption prices
pcih	pc - pih
<u>pf</u>	foreign producer prices, manufacturing
<u>pg</u>	public consumption prices
pi	investment prices
<u>pih</u>	housing investment prices
<u>pm</u>	import prices
<u>pmo</u>	import prices of oil
<u>pq</u>	GDP deflator
<u>pr</u>	prices of raw materials
prz	pr - pz
px	export prices of goods (excluding bilateral)
pxf	px - pf
pz	domestic demand prices
pzm	pz - pm
q	manufacturing production
r	interest rate (government bond yield)
<u>rd</u>	discount rate
<u>s</u>	employers' social security contributions
<u>t</u>	linear trend
<u>w</u>	wage rate
<u>wc</u>	contract wage rate
<u>wn</u>	$w*(1+s)$
<u>wr</u>	$w*(1+s) - pq$
x	exports of goods (excluding bilateral exports)
<u>xe</u>	bilateral exports
<u>y</u>	gross domestic product at constant 1985 market prices (GDP)
<u>ye</u>	instrumental variable for output (determined by f and g)
<u>yh</u>	households' disposable income
yhr	yh - pc
<u>yi</u>	instrumental variable for output (determined by xe, f, (px-pq) and ig)
z	domestic demand

corresponding diagnostic statistics are, however, reported in Appendix 1.) The estimates are OLS estimates; Hatanaka's iterative IV estimates (see the discussion on page 5) are presented in Appendix 2. The model uses seasonally adjusted data which are almost entirely derived from the Finnish National Accounts. A novel feature of the current version of the model is the treatment of expectations. It is assumed that inflation and income expectations are formed rationally given the current period information. Inflation expectations, in turn, affect wages and (expected) real interest rates. Inflation expectations together with (household's disposable) income expectations determine expected real income, which affects both private consumption and investment in residential construction.¹

Obviously, this kind of specification creates problems both in terms of estimation and simulation. As far as the estimation problems are concerned, we try to solve them by making use of the Iterative Instrumental Variable technique proposed by Hatanaka (1978). Thus, we first estimate the whole model using OLS, the period of estimation being 1971.1 - 1986.4. Then we form the Gauss-Seidel solution for the whole model and use the solution as the instrument for both the expected inflation rate and the current period endogenous variables. The solution of the model is carried out using the Extended Path Method developed by Fair and Taylor (1983). In order to improve the small-sample properties of the estimators the whole procedure is iterated several times.

As a rule, no serious computational problems were encountered in estimation and simulation. This is obviously due to the small size

¹Household's disposable income is endogenous in the model in the sense that it is determined by the income tax rate, employment (a distinction is made between wage-earners and self-employed persons), the wage rate and other income (which is modelled using an auxiliary equation in terms of the wage rate, the price level, the self-employed person's employment and the time trend).

of the model, and also to the fact that only one period-ahead predictions are used in the basic version of the model.²

We are not able here to discuss all features of (the rational expectations version) of QMED. Suffice it to say that it is basically a Keynesian macromodel in which effective demand plays a crucial role. There are, however, some features which abstract from this standard Keynesian framework: first, prices, wages and interest rates are not (completely) rigid; second, the capacity variable is endogenous, allowing for supply side effects; third, the demand for labor and capital depend on relative prices and some demand shift variables - not on actual output; and, finally, inflationary and income expectations are modelled using the rational expectations framework.

We cannot really describe in any detail here how the model works. Thus, we limit our reporting to the presentation of the Mean Absolute Percent Errors (MAPE) for some key variables (see Table 2)

²Various path extension parameter k values and various tolerance levels were used in solving the model. Thus, k was taken to be between 2 and 10, and the tolerance levels were varied between .01 and .000001 for the three iteration types which were used in solving the model (see Fair and Taylor (1983) and Fisher et al (1985) for details of the procedure). Different values for k did not make any noticeable difference. Rather, the tolerance level turned out to be of little importance. For instance, as regards GDP, we could detect an average difference of magnitude of .01 % between two successive simulations, which differed by .1 in terms of the tolerance level, over 44 periods (with k this difference was of the magnitude of .0005 %). The average total number of passes through the model for the overall solution was about 10 000. However, when the time horizon of inflation and income expectations was extended to two periods (see the discussion on page 10) about 25 000 passes were required. The corresponding average amount of CPU time with a Burroughs A12 computer was about 6 minutes (in the case of the static expectations version of the model only about 20 seconds were required). Most of the computational work was carried out using the IAS-SYSTEM software (see Sonnberger (1985) for details). In the present study the tolerance level was set at .005 for all three types of iteration; k , in turn, was set at 3. The model was estimated with three iterations of Hatanaka's IV estimation procedure. On another occasion we experimented by continuing the iterations until ten but further iterations did not produce any noticeable difference in results.

and of the dynamic simulation results for the period 1971.1 - 1997.4 (see Figure 1 for the actual and forecast values of GDP and of private consumption prices). The dynamic simulation for the estimation period is based on the actual values of the exogenous variables while for the ex ante forecast period (1987.1 - 1997.4) it is based on the extrapolated values of the exogenous variables. To be more precise, it has been assumed that the growth rates of the exogenous variables are the same as for the period 1980.1 - 1985.4. In addition, we report some standard policy simulations using changes in interest rates, contract wages, public consumption and investment as well as taxes, and, finally, oil prices as "policy variables".³

Figure 1 Forecast performance of the QMED-model

Clearly, the MAPE values and the ex post simulations presented in Figure 1 indicate that the model generates the actual data rather well. This is true particularly if one takes into account the relatively (in a cross-country sense) high volatility of Finnish exports and price movements during the sample period. Moreover, there do not appear to be any noticeable problems in terms of the long-run properties of the model (see especially the forecast values for the period 1987.1 - 1997.4).

³In order to understand the logic of these simulations it should perhaps be pointed out that Finland is a highly unionized country (the overall unionization rate being about 80 %) and thus collective wage agreements covering the whole economy are (or at least seem to be) of crucial importance. As far as determination of interest rates is concerned, they are (or have been until very recently) effectively controlled by the Bank of Finland via the discount rate.

Table 2 MAPE-values for the estimation period 1971.1 - 1986.4, %

	OLS	OLS (PWS)	H2S
Gross Domestic Product (v)	1.44	1.44	1.48
Private Consumption (v)	2.18	2.13	2.06
Private Investment (v)	2.37	2.39	2.40
Exports (v)	3.55	3.46	3.53
Imports (v)	3.03	3.35	3.09
Implicit GDP Deflator (p)	1.05	2.77	1.18
Consumption Prices (p)	1.79	3.63	1.20
Export Prices (p)	3.57	4.44	3.64
Wage Rate (p)	2.08	3.98	1.70
Employment (h)	1.00	1.00	.99

v refers to volumes, p to implicit price deflators and h to working hours. OLS (OLS(PWS)) indicates the MAPE-values obtained using the OLS version of the model with exogenous (endogenous) contract wages. H2S indicates the MAPE-values obtained with Hatanaka's iterative IV version of the model.

We now turn to the simulation results presented in Table 3. The effects of the following sustained policy changes on gross domestic product (y), consumption prices (pc), the interest rate (r) and current account balance (rb) are tabulated: an increase in (a) the discount rate, (b) the contract wage rate, (c) public consumption, (d) public consumption and taxes, (e) public investment and taxes, and (f) oil prices. All these changes take place at the beginning of the first quarter of 1972, the model being solved, however, from the first quarter of 1971. Thus, the changes are already known in advance. We do not discuss here the time paths of these policy effects. Rather, we hope it suffices to point out that these time paths are - at least in our opinion - fairly standard (cf. e.g. Taylor (1985)). An increase in interest rates has a persistent - albeit declining - effect on GDP and a persistent - albeit very small - effect on prices. In the oil price simulation the GDP effect is similar but the price effect is - as one might expect - much stronger. An increase in contract wages has only a temporary positive effect on GDP, which becomes negative after only two years (this is due to the deterioration in competitiveness; notice that the exchange rate index is kept unchanged in this simulation). Finally, expansive fiscal policy has a positive effect on output.

Table 3 Policy Simulation Results¹⁾

	72.1	73.1	74.1	75.1	76.1
a. Interest rate simulation ²⁾					
y	-.02	-.10	-.11	-.08	-.05
pc	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.02	-.03
rb	1	8	22	37	49
r	.24	.71	.84	.88	.89
b. Contract wage simulation ³⁾					
y	.10	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.05
pc	.30	.79	.84	.84	.85
rb	-3	-11	-20	-32	-41
r	.02	.02	.01	.00	.00
c. Public consumption simulation ⁴⁾					
y	1.70	1.00	.78	.70	.61
pc	.00	.03	.07	.11	.15
rb	-31	-51	-96	-131	-146
r	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
d. Balanced budget simulation ⁵⁾					
y	1.12	.31	.26	.39	.47
pc	-.00	.00	-.01	-.04	-.08
rb	-4	34	90	147	202
r	-.00	.00	.00	-.00	-.00
e. Public investment simulation ⁶⁾					
y	.46	.46	.77	1.15	1.65
pc	-.00	-.03	-.10	-.21	-.36
rb	27	84	214	369	524
r	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01
f. Oil price simulation ⁷⁾					
y	-.01	-.05	-.08	-.10	-.08
pc	.08	.21	.44	.64	.73
rb	-36	-39	-130	-124	-130
r	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01

1) Effects are given as cumulative percentage differences between base and variant for GDP, y, and consumer prices, pc, and as absolute differences for the interest rate, r, (%) and the current account, rb (millions of FIM). All changes are permanent. Except for simulation b, the contract wage rate is endogenous in the model.

2) A one percentage point increase in the central bank's discount rate.

3) A one per cent increase in the contract wage rate.

4) An increase in public consumption by an amount equal to one per cent of GDP.

5) An increase in public consumption by one per cent of GDP and financed by an equal increase in income tax revenue.

6) An increase in public enterprises' investment by one per cent of GDP and financed by an equal increase in income tax revenue.

7) A ten per cent increase in oil prices.

There is a multiplier effect of the magnitude of 1.5, the long-run effect being about .5. (Obviously, these values depend very much on the way the deficit is financed: for instance in alternative c it is assumed that foreign borrowing is used).⁴ The public investment simulation indicates that if one is able to change the structure of demand so that consumption is decreased and (productive) investment is increased, this has a significant positive effect on output. This is due to a positive capacity effect, which, in turn, affects wages, prices and net exports. Thus, the model suggests that public sector could achieve some favourable growth effects with a well-designed structural policy.

3 EXAMINING THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS

Next, we deal with the question of how expectations operate in this model. To do so, we consider four alternative versions of the model or ways of performing the policy simulation. The policy simulation on which we concentrate here is the contract wage simulation, in which the contract wage rate is increased by one per cent at the beginning of the first quarter of 1972. The alternatives are:

- 1) We use the REH version of the model (see Table 1) and assume that the change in contract wages is already known at the beginning of the first quarter of 1971.
- 2) We change the model by extending the time horizon for inflation and income expectations to two periods and assume again that the change in contract wages is known in advance.
- 3) We repeat simulation 1 but assume now that the policy change is not known in advance.

⁴The contract wage, public demand and tax rate simulations are based on the assumption that the central bank pegs the discount rate. Moreover, the exchange rate index is treated as exogenous. Thus, the resulting real interest rate and real exchange rate effects do to some extent affect the long-run adjustment paths, which, however, are not the main interest here.

- 4) We change the model by using static expectations for the rate of change in consumption prices and household's disposable income, respectively.

The results of these simulations are reported in Figure 2. When the results are scrutinized, it turns out that there is at least one important difference in the results. Namely, simulations 1 and 2, on the one hand, and simulations 3 and 4, on the other hand, differ considerably in terms of the advance effect. Thus, if we use a rational expectations specification(s) and allow economic agents to know the policy change in advance this change already has significant (real) effects before the policy change actually takes place.

In this model, the advance effects are mainly due to the income effect: household's real disposable income will increase and households react to this increase in advance by increasing consumption and investment in residential construction. In addition to this "income effect" the model reacts to inflationary expectations. A change in inflationary expectations operates through the direct inflation effect (which affects consumption negatively) and the real interest rate effect (which tends to increase consumption) (see equations 3 and 4 in Table 1).

It is not only in terms of the advance effects that these three simulations are different. The whole short-run dynamics is very different. In the case of simulations 1 and especially 2 the advance effect dominates the whole short-run dynamics. This effect is of considerable magnitude. If the time horizon of expectations is two periods, a one per cent increase in contract wages increases GDP by .06 per cent during the previous year. If the time horizon is only one period - as in the basic version of our model - the effect on an annual basis is a little bit less than one half of this. By contrast, in the case of simulation 3 (the "surprise case") the positive short-run effect is strikingly small: the positive consumption (real wage) effect is nearly offset by the simultaneous negative net exports effect. Finally, in the case of simulation 4 (with static inflation and income expectations) the simulated time

paths are very close to those of the "surprise" simulation 3 (the positive output effect being, however, slightly larger). Thus, in a sense one can say that old-fashioned static expectations macromodels assume that all policy changes are, in fact, unanticipated.

Even though the simulations differ considerably in terms of short-run effects, the medium-run and long-run effects are very similar. In the medium run the effect is either nil or slightly negative while in the long run the effect is clearly negative.⁵

Figure 2 Effect of an increase in contract wages on GDP under different forms of expectations formation (% difference between base and variant).

One could of course discuss the proper ways of specifying the transmission mechanisms of price and income expectations, for instance in the context of the present model. It is clear that the present specification is deficient in many respects. For instance, in the case of firms (i.e. labor and capital demand) rational expectations do not play any role.⁶ But we do not think that this is of crucial importance. What is important here is the fact that rational expectations do matter. That is, the short-run effects of various "policy" changes are extremely sensitive with respect to the way expectations are allowed to have an influence in the model.

4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our model is by no means complete. This is particularly true as regards the way expectations are modelled. Even so, some interesting

⁵The results seem to be analogous to those obtained by Fair (1979).


⁶A similar nonsymmetry in terms of expectations and intertemporal substitution possibilities can be found for instance in the famous Lucas and Rapping (1969) model.

new results can be obtained by making use of rational expectations (and by allowing for flexible wages and prices as well as supply side effects). Without attempting to summarize our results in full, we would like to stress two points. First, the estimation and simulation of (small-scale) models which make use of some form of rational expectations does not represent a computational nightmare - as was generally assumed in the 1970's (cf. e.g. Poole (1976)). Second, we can no longer carry out policy simulations without specifying whether the change is anticipated or unanticipated. This would seem to suggest that treating policy variables as exogenous should be considered with great caution. Clearly, it is not only the question of whether some variables are endogenous or exogenous which becomes delicate with the rational expectations macromodels. Such things as "the existence of policy regimes" and "the credibility of economic policy" also start to be real problems. If the advance effects are really of crucial importance then it is, of course, of crucial importance how different signals from policy-makers are interpreted. That, in turn, has something to do with past record of policy actions.⁷

⁷Unfortunately, we cannot continue this discussion further here. The interested reader is referred to Barro and Gordon (1983) and Friedman (1979).

Figure 1

Gross Domestic Product
Forecast



Private consumption prices
Forecast




Figure 2(a) : Gross Domestic Product





Figure 2(b) : Private Consumption Prices



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Appendix 1.

Diagnostic test statistics

Equation No.	r ₁	r ₂	r ₃	r ₄	CHOW	J-B	ARCH(4)
1	-.764	-.277	1.258	-1.088	.749	.416	11.904
2	-1.374	-.317	-1.568	.380	2.717	.112	6.016
3	-.897	-.367	1.094	-.670	-	1.903	3.776
4	-1.255	.325	.289	-1.583	2.975	.377	2.496
5	-1.494	.675	1.302	-2.160	-	1.559	3.840
6	1.611	1.199	.538	.360	-	1.491	7.104
7	-.113	1.662	-1.294	1.780	2.783	1.163	5.440
8	.066	-.264	-1.047	2.762	.501	6.980	1.920
9	-1.150	-1.633	-.859	3.635	-	2.099	26.048
10	-.094	-3.851	-1.231	3.206	-	.917	11.520
11	-.190	-.383	-1.316	-.171	-	1.072	1.984
12	.906	-.696	1.447	1.232	3.521	10.805	7.936
13	2.516	.840	1.327	-.157	-	23.808	1.152
Critical values	1.645	1.645	1.645	1.645	2.370	5.991	9.488

Equation numbers are the same as in Table 1. The r_i 's refer to Godfrey's autocorrelation test statistics for lags 1, 2, 3 and 4, CHOW to the Chow stability test statistic for the period 1977.2 (due to dummy variables this statistic could not be computed for all equations), J-B to the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality, and ARCH(4) to Engle's autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity test statistic for four lags. For other details, see Krämer and Sonnberger (1986).

Appendix 2.

Hatanaka's Iterative IV Estimates of the Main Behavioral Equations of the QMED-Model

$$(1) \quad \Delta x = - .346*\Delta x(-4) - .669*\Delta pxf(-2) - .369*(x-f)(-1) \\ + .362*(x-f)(-2) + .800*\Delta f + .638*\Delta f(-2) + .360*cap(-2)$$

$$R^2 = .553 \quad D-W = 2.180 \quad SE = .052$$

$$(2) \quad \Delta m = 1.181*\Delta z + .680*\Delta pzm - .486*(m-z)(-1) \\ + .262*(m-z)(-2) + .207*(m-z)(-3) - .252*cap(-1)$$

$$R^2 = .569 \quad D-W = 2.335 \quad SE = .055$$

$$(3) \quad c = .678*c(-1) + .316*yhr(+1) - .001*(r-(400*\Delta pc(+1))) \\ - .781*\Delta pc(+1) + .024*d1 + 1.495$$

$$R^2 = .992 \quad D-W = 2.646 \quad SE = .012$$

$$(4) \quad ih = .566*ih(-1) + .270*yhr(+1) - 1.987*hk(-1) + 13.791*n \\ - .003*(r-(400*\Delta pc(+1))) - 0.466*pcih(-4) - 85.748$$

$$R^2 = .720 \quad D-W = 2.281 \quad SE = .046$$

$$(5) \quad \Delta if = \Delta ye - .399*(if-y)(-1) - .062*d13*(if-y)(-1) \\ - .001*\Delta(r-(400*\Delta pi))(-1) - .494*\Delta wr(-4) + .111*d14 \\ + .110*d15 + .111*d16 - .896$$

$$R^2 = .572 \quad D-W = 2.351 \quad SE = .045$$

$$(6) \quad \Delta l = .195*\Delta l(-4) + 1.054*\Delta yi - .049*\Delta wr(-4) \\ - .203*(1-n)(-1) - .043*cap(-1) \\ - .005*d2 + .023*d3 + .007*d4 - .299$$

$$R^2 = .650 \quad D-W = 1.490 \quad SE = .004$$

$$(7) \quad \Delta w = .110*\Delta 4(pc(+1)) + .891*\Delta wc - .011*cap(-1)$$

$$R^2 = .886 \quad D-W = 1.908 \quad SE = .005$$

$$(8) \quad \Delta pc = .308*\Delta wn + .126*\Delta wn(-1) + .231*\Delta wn(-2) + .077*\Delta pm \\ + .058*\Delta pm(-1) + .053*pm(-2)$$

$$R^2 = .695 \quad D-W = 1.976 \quad SE = .007$$

$$(9) \quad \Delta p_i = .593 \cdot \Delta w_n + .043 \cdot \Delta p_{mo} + .043 \cdot \Delta p_m(-2) + .180 \cdot \Delta p_i(-1) \\ + .012 \cdot d_5 + .013 \cdot d_6$$

$$R^2 = .437 \quad D-W = 2.172 \quad SE = .015$$

$$(10) \quad \Delta p_g = .612 \cdot \Delta w_n + .206 \cdot \Delta w_n(-3) + .097 \cdot \Delta p_m + .007 \cdot d_7 \\ - .053 \cdot d_8 + .028 \cdot d_9$$

$$R^2 = .725 \quad D-W = 1.980 \quad SE = .010$$

$$(11) \quad \Delta p_x = .159 \cdot \Delta^2(\Delta p_x)(-2) + .325 \cdot \Delta w_n + .482 \cdot \Delta p_f + .192 \cdot \Delta e_r(-4) \\ + .060 \cdot d_{10} + .057 \cdot d_{11}$$

$$R^2 = .705 \quad D-W = 2.048 \quad SE = .019$$

$$(12) \quad r = .747 \cdot r(-1) + 13.560 \Delta p_c + .215 \cdot r_d + 3.354 \cdot \Delta d_r$$

$$R^2 = .890 \quad D-W = 1.803 \quad SE = .548$$

$$(13) \quad q = .428 \cdot q(-1) + .570 \cdot z + .082 \cdot i_g - .108 \cdot d_{12} - 1.611$$

$$R^2 = .988 \quad D-W = 1.354 \quad SE = .020$$

$$(14) \quad cap = .006 \cdot t - 2.066 + .7 \cdot k(-1) + .3 \cdot n - q + mr$$

All definitions are the same as in Table 1. The contract wage rate was assumed to be exogenous in this version of the model.

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